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1. Introduction 
The term ‘resilience’, whilst being surrounded by various debates on its meaning, usefulness 
and characteristics, has become an integral part of Disaster Risk Management (DRM) 
terminology.  DRM is defined as “The systematic process of using administrative directives, 
organizations, and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and 
improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the 
possibility of disaster” (UNISDR, 2007). 
Within the context of DRM, different approaches to resilience provide different levels of 
importance to the objectives of avoidance (avoid the shock), recovery (rebound after the 
shock) and withstanding (resist the shock). Tobin (1999) suggests that resilience is adopted in 
three ways: as a way to mitigate (emphasising a reduction of exposures and risks); as a way 
to recover (accepting that not all the shocks can be eliminated and thus embraces actions that 
are required after them); and as a way to instigate structural changes in society and 
institutions (based on the importance of situational factors (physical location, age, income, 
etc.) and cognitive factors (psychological and attitudinal)). 
Literature on resilience and its role in DRM also focuses on different aspects. Some 
concentrate on conceptualising the idea of resilience metaphor and finding its connections to 
societies and the environments (e.g. Brand and Jax, 2007; Pelling, 2003). Others focus their 
attention on local resilience, including urban resilience and local and community-level 
adaptation to climate change (e.g. O’Brien and Read, 2005; Prasad et al., 2009); emphasis on 
local resilience rests on the belief that resilience is largely dependent on local action and 
micro-scale conditions. Some literature argues for a holistic or a broader systems approach to 
resilience (e.g. Martin-Breen and Anderies, 2011; Lizarralde et al., 2013); this group is based 
on the ‘Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015’ (UNISDR, 2005) and the revised and 
recently adopted ‘Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction’ (UNISDR, 2015b). These 
frameworks argue that a broader approach that integrates multiple levels of analysis and 
intervention (from individual to the national level); multiple time-scales: prevention, 
emergency, rehabilitation, reconstruction, long-term development; and, multiple sectors of 
intervention, including emergency action, environmental protection and urban development. 
However despite the lack of consensus about what ‘resilience’ means the term has in recent 
years became a central element in policy documents and programmes at international, 
national and regional levels (Aldunce et al., 2014). In the UK, since the introduction of the 
Civil Contingency Act (the Act) in 2004, civil protection activity has been conducted under 
the epithet of ‘UK resilience’ (HM Government, 2004a). As this chapter will explore, ‘UK 
resilience’ covers a great variety of areas, from national security to international aid. In this 
chapter we will demonstrate how resilience policy is implemented in a way that focuses on 
response rather than on prevention; and also we highlight some of the issues in implementing 
such policies at the local level.  
2. Resilience agenda in the UK 
2.1 DRM and resilience  
Some sections of the UK Government view DRM as one of the key areas that require future 
attention, as “important drivers of change could substantially increase future risks of 
disasters, notably the increasing frequency of extreme weather events due to climate change, 
and large population increases in cities exposed to natural hazards” (Foresight, 2012:5). The 
main objectives of DRM in the UK are (UNISDR, 2013): 
- Spotting trouble, assessing its nature and providing warning; 
- Being ready to respond; 
- Building greater resilience for the future; 
- Providing leadership and guidance to resilient communities; and  
- Effective management.  
However, DRM has not always been at the top of the agenda. Since 2001, there has been a 
shift in how disaster risk has been managed and a dramatic change in purpose and 
organisation of ‘civil protection’ in the UK. In place of the Cold War model of civil defence, 
there emerged a model full of interdependencies and with increased connections with society 
and (Mann, 2007). The UK civil protection plan was significantly restructured to codify 
existing practices and introduce new statutory duties (O’Brien and Read, 2005) but in doing 
so still utilising the agencies and personnel that were largely grounded in a civil defence 
mentality (Bosher 2014). In 2004 the UK government implemented a legislative and capacity 
building programme under the banner of UK Resilience. However, as O’Brien and Read 
(2005) point out, ‘the use of the term resilience is an interesting choice’ (p.354), because 
whilst policy makers increasingly use the term, it was not particularly well defined.  
The ‘resilience agenda’ goes hand in hand with the ‘security agenda’ in the UK, however 
whilst the security agenda has traditionally been centralised, the resilience agenda retreats 
from ‘grand planning’ and offers ‘a legitimate path for disengagement’ of the State (Haldrup 
and Rosen, 2013) by becoming a ‘facilitator’ instead of a ‘builder’ of resilience. At the same 
time, however, whilst it is argued that the resilience agenda is effectively the same as the 
security agenda, the term ‘resilience’ only covers particular areas. The traditional security 
discourse which focuses on defence does not use the term, but it is used frequently when it 
comes to the area of DRM, which includes wider security issues such as terrorism and 
cybercrime, as well as civil emergencies. 
UK Resilience takes an ‘all hazards’ approach, the objective of which is to ensure ‘that a 
robust infrastructure of response is in place to deal rapidly, effectively and flexibly with the 
consequences of civil devastation and widespread disasters inflicted as a result of 
conventional or non-conventional disruptive activity’ (UK Resilience, 2007 in Rogers, 2011, 
p. 94).  
Cabinet Office (2012) defines resilience as “the ability of the community, services, and of 
infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, to withstand, handle and recover from 
disruptive challenges”. This definition underpins the development of all subsequent 
resilience-related work, including the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) framework (which will 
be discussed later in this Chapter), the National Risk Register and National Security Strategy, 
the identification of people who might be vulnerable in a crisis, data protection protocols, 
cyber-security programmes, and plans for the protection of critical infrastructure and the 
prevention of violent extremism (Cabinet Office, 2012).  
The UK has an established system for emergency planning and engagement between required 
stakeholders (see Figure 1) described in the Civil Contingencies Act (the Act) (Cabinet 
Office, 2004a). This system is a network of designated governmental, non-governmental and 
private organisation (typically referred to as ‘responders’) that can be activated during an 
emergency and is enacted through exercising and training. This network does not exist 
permanently (and does not have statutory rights) as the organisations remain formally 
separate, but is activated if an emergency event occurs. This approach ensures that responders 
potentially exist at any point in time based on the multi-agency plans that can be changed 
based on past experiences (Anderson and Adey, 2012).  
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Figure 1: Emergency response arrangements in the UK (Adapted from: Fisher et al., 2014) 
The Act was the starting point of a new contingencies system that has been developed as a 
result of various events in the period between 1989 and 2001 (including flooding, terrorist 
incidents, epidemics and fuel protests). The overarching aim of the Act is preparedness, so all 
the decisions in the Act are geared towards the negotiation of the potentialities of the event 
but at the same opening out the possibilities of response that can be adapted to a specific 
event. But rather than focusing on the event itself, the Act emphasises the generic 
consequences of events for human welfare, the environment, and the national security (Adey 
and Anderson, 2011).  
Whilst UK Cabinet office has ultimate responsibility for civil protection, resilience is carried 
out through the Local Resilience Forum (LRF), because emergencies typically start at the 
local level, and most incidents are expected to be able to be dealt with by local responders at 
this level. The Act describes the duties of appropriate stakeholders to cooperate in a LRF, and 
formal meetings and allocations of work to responsible stakeholders. It broadens the 
understanding of civil contingencies activity that now includes planning, preparation, 
response, recovery and protection, and requires Category 1 and Category 2 responders (Table 
1) within a given locality to coordinate and prepare for the causes and consequences of 
various events. The coordination however is event-specific and the participation of Category 
2 responders and other stakeholders depends on the type, location and scale of the event.  
The LRFs, which are defined along Police Constabulary boundaries, typically meet three 
times a year to discuss emergency planning within their county. In the event of a major 
emergency, the group would form the Strategic Coordinating Group for that emergency, i.e. it 
would provide a forum for the co-ordination of a multi-agency response. A number of sub-
groups with specific areas of responsibility meet six times per year and report to the LRF. 
However LRFs are neither legal entity nor do they have powers to direct their members, 
which is often seen as a weakness of such systems (Manyena et al., 2013). 
Table 1: The range of key ‘responders’  
Overall, The UK Civil Contingencies Act places less emphasis on dealing with major 
catastrophe and more on a range of events that threaten to disrupt, damage, or destroy life, 
thus focusing on preparedness and response to these events – the implications of this will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  
2.2 Resilience policy 
Whilst efforts to implement resilience are taken at the local level, the majority of the UK 
policy documents examined refer to measures and initiatives that have a national/country 
scope of influence. This is hardly surprising, given that the policy is written by the national 
government; but at the same time, considering the strong influence that the idea of 
community and city resilience has had in literature (Norris et al., 2008; Pelling, 2003; 
Stumpp, 2013; Tobin, 1999), it becomes clear that UK policy has had to make efforts to 
redefine the boundaries of the resilience approach.  
CATEGORY 1 RESPONDERS
Local Authorities All principal local authorities
G o v e r n m e n t 
agencies Environment Agency, DEFRA, Maritime and Coastguard Agency
Emergency Services Police Forces, British Transport Police, Fire Authorities, Ambulance Services
Health Services Primary Care Trusts, Health Protection Agency, National Health Service Acute Trusts (Hospitals), Foundation Trusts, Port Health Authorities
CATEGORY 2 RESPONDERS
Utilities Electricity, Gas, Water and Sewerage, Public communications providers (landlines and mobiles)
Transport Network Rail, Train Operating Companies (Passenger and Freight), Transport for London, London Underground, Airports, Harbours and Ports, Highways Agency
Government Health and Safety Executive
Other Chamber of Commerce, non-Governmental organisations and social care charities
Resilience is mentioned in documents aimed at foreign affairs, for example: The UK 
government’s humanitarian policy (DFID, 2011), which “outlines how the UK will help build 
resilience to crises and respond to humanitarian need resulting from conflict and natural 
disasters”. One of the programmes is ‘Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate 
Extremes and Disasters Programme’ (BRACED) supported by the Department for 
International Development. It is also used in relation to terms of data protection (service 
resilience) and telecommunications (Cabinet Office, 2011a). The definition of resilience 
therefore resonates with a wider discussion within the UK Government on how to handle new 
forms of risk triggered by a more globalised and interconnected world.  
As demonstrated by a recent in-depth policy analysis  (Figure 2), the policy framework 1
focuses on using a multi-hazard approach, taking into account natural hazards as well as man-
made threats (although the term ‘resilience’ is not used in the Terrorism Act). 
!  
Figure 2 ‘Resilience to what’ in UK policy  (Chmutina et al. 2014) 2
All the activities are based around the integrated emergency planning (cycle of emergency 
planning): “Central government’s approach to civil contingency planning is built around the 
concept of resilience. This is defined as the ability “at every relevant level to detect, prevent, 
and, if necessary, to handle and recover from disruptive challenges”. The processes which 
underpin resilience form the fundamental elements of civil protection.” (Cabinet Office, 
2003: 1). It is appreciated that it is impossible to fully eliminate some risks, therefore 
resilience is seen by the Government as a way of building capacity to respond to emergency 
events while taking into account the potential interdependencies of services/systems that 
maybe disrupted; accordingly, resilience in this context primarily refers to the capacity to 
respond to emergencies and to quickly return to some form of ‘normality’.  
Unsurprisingly, several representations of community resilience focus on emergency 
response. One of them argues that resilience corresponds to “Community and individuals 
harnessing local resources and expertise to help themselves in an emergency, in a way that 
complements the response of the emergency services” (Cabinet office, 2011, p.11). This 
representation largely ignores the idea of ‘bouncing forward’ (Brown, 2011; Birkmann, 2012) 
and thus is at odds with some theoretical definitions that refer to the importance of producing 
structural changes in the system, rather than merely returning to previous states of it (Bosher, 
2014). In addition, the UK resilience agenda – by encouraging ‘active citizenship’ – 
motivates people to engage with situations that are deemed beyond their control; this often 
leads to a passive attitude from the public (Joseph, 2013).  
The Cabinet Office has ultimate responsibility for civil protection; however the main tool 
through which resilience is carried out are the LRFs that are non-statutory entities (Birkmann 
et al., 2012). Local efforts in enhancing resilience are built on collaboration between 
organisations whereas central efforts are based on command and control. The ‘resilience 
agenda’ in the UK introduced a number of neoliberal  policies that were seen as a way to 3
move away from state-enforced security by adopting an ideology that appears to be on ‘the 
side of laissez-faire’ (Amin, 2013, p.141). The ‘command and control’ approach was based on 
the idea that the public entrusts their safety into the hands of an authority, whereas now the 
resilience agenda is based on a large amount of information, advice, expert opinion as well as 
‘heroism’ stories where an individual acts in an emergency (Amin, 2013); it emphasises the 
desirability of personal contingency plans and importance of public involvement and at the 
same time makes an emergency a ‘shared problem’. This eventually creates tensions, notably 
when centralised decisions undermine local efforts. 
National policy serves as a background for implementation, but a strong emphasis is set on 
expected capacities at the local level: “Government can set a framework for sustainable 
development at a national level, but many changes need to happen through the Big Society at 
a local level, […] The Big Society puts individuals and groups in the driving seat and 
Government in an enabling role removing the barriers, where appropriate, which prevent 
others from taking responsibility.” (DEFRA, 2011, p.5) 
The UK Government sees resilience as a proactive response to a new unpredictable and 
unstable world (Aradau, 2014) but these expectations are significantly vague. Thus local 
stakeholders understand and adjust the principles of resilience differently, holding also 
several expectations from other stakeholders, notably municipalities and control agencies.  
3. Tensions between policy and practice 
The definition of resilience provided by the national policy is not strictly accepted at the local 
level and in addition is reified by the professional remits of those who are ‘implementing 
resilience’ (Chmutina et al. 2014). Policy on resilience in the UK has put much emphasis on 
the capacities expected from other stakeholders in order to achieve ‘resilience’ and provide an 
integrated emergency planning approach. This leads to tensions not only among national 
policy makers and local level policy implementers, but also among those who are directly and 
indirectly affected by the Resilience Programme. One of the most obvious tensions is created 
by the focus of policy documents and policy implementation on preparedness and response 
thus neglecting the role that can be played by preventative measures.  
Whilst UK policy acknowledges the importance of prevention (as it features in its definition 
of resilience), the majority of policy that emphasises the importance of the local level 
resilience actually focuses on response. This is clearly demonstrated in the terminology: local 
level responders are expected to understand resilience as a way to deal with an event, i.e. 
being prepared for the event in order to be able to respond to it rather than to eliminate it. The 
focus on preparedness and response is demonstrated in the choice of wording when it comes 
to defining resilience as demonstrated in Figure 3. The widespread use of the term resilience 
in the national policy documents is not reflected at the local level and is often at odds with 
the practical understanding of resilience. Figure 3 illustrates how the understandings of 
‘resilience’ appear to change from policy level to practical implementation level, with the 
‘prevention’ aspects being lost at the local level, which is more focused on coping and being 
robust.  
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Figure 3: Characteristics of resilience within four sectors of intervention (Chmutina et al. 2014) 
Unsurprisingly, the definition of resilience provided by the LRF that was at the centre of this 
study goes in line with the definition provided by the Act, and has permeated into every 
aspect of emergency services’ activities. At the same time, due to the complex nature of the 
LRF and the diverse profile of professional remits of its members, the LRF adds an extra 
layer to the definition with the regards to the fact that resilience is more about the 
organisational capacity of the responders. Additionally, their definitions focus on 
characteristics of resilience rather than the process of implementing resilience (as emphasised 
by the policy).  
Preparedness plays a larger role among the local implementers of resilience. Planners and 
flood managers see resilience as preparedness and argue that in some cases, when complete 
safety cannot be achieved due to practical (including financial) reasons, preparedness and 
protection (which tend to be used as synonyms of resilience) are the best routes. Resilience is 
understood as preparedness to something that is out of order, although it is seen as a long-
term process that will eventually lead to the incorporation of resilience into day-to-day 
practice. On the other hand, emergency services identify resilience with the ability to respond 
to important events, as officers believe that it is impossible to be fully prepared to all risks. 
However, they also acknowledge that resilience should be a business as usual type of activity: 
it is an embedded process that does not get acknowledged unless the issues of safety and 
security are specifically expressed by the client. This understanding of resilience however 
does not sufficiently focus on the more serious low(er) probability types of events. Resilience 
is a part of day-to-day practice included in business as usual, and its implementation is 
assumed.  
As demonstrated here, the role of prevention is neglected on both national and local levels. 
Whilst being one of the most important components of Disaster Risk Reduction, in respect of 
managing the impact of natural hazards and man-made threats, it is also the hardest to 
implement as it involves a much broader range of stakeholders and requires awareness 
raising, information distribution and typically financial investment. The main challenge in 
highlighting the importance of prevention lies in the fact that the UK Resilience Programme 
is aiming at improving coordination among the emergency services but does not particularly 
take into account community involvement. The UK policy defines community resilience in a 
rather restrictive way: “Community and individuals harnessing local resources and expertise 
to help themselves in an emergency, in a way that complements the response of the emergency 
services” (Cabinet office, 2011b) - as it does not provide any information on the activities 
that would ‘complement the response’ nor does it emphasise the importance of self-reliance. 
To an extent, policy and the actions of LRF underestimate the ability of the community to 
respond and instead suggest relying on the Category 1 responders, and provide a clear 
distinction between those who respond and the population that has to be protected (Anderson 
and Adey, 2012). Curiously, however, when policies are analysed (Table 2), the words such as 
‘community’, ‘public’ and ‘localism’ appear much more often in policy documents that in 
practitioners’ vocabulary, the focus of which is on ‘planning’, ‘designing’ and ‘building’ for 
the event. Even when it comes to business continuity – which plays a much larger role in the 
resilience agenda compared to community resilience - the emphasis is on preparedness rather 
than prevention.  
Table 2 Ten most frequently used words relevant to resilience among policy documents and practitioners’ responses 
(Chmutina et al. 2014) 
4. Discussion and conclusions  
Whilst the UK government’s definition of resilience is portrayed to be holistic, when 
scrutinised, it really only focuses on particular aspects of risk can be managed and thus 
undermines the more holistic understanding of resilience. The resilience agenda in the UK 
deals with emergency situations, which if occur could test the limits of capacity and 
capability of those implementing resilience, and focuses on anticipation of emergency events 
and the disruptions caused by them. However, as argued by those implementing resilience 
(such as members of the LRFs), it is impossible to always predict the event and/or level of 
disruption it will cause, and this uncertainty leads to a lack of interest or appreciation of the 
benefits of taking preventive measures. Response activities can be very visible (publically 
and politically) actions and thus they can bring hope that such interventions can bring the 
event and its impact to an end. Therefore preparedness activities can effectively influence 
public opinions about how the emergency services and local government agencies have 
handled emergency events. When considering preventative activities they can be deemed as 
being expensive, they may never be needed and also there can be political and social 
concerns that some sections of society are benefiting (i.e. a flood risk area of a town) at the 
cost of others (areas of the same town that are safe from flooding) (Bosher et al. 2009).  
National level Local level
national resilience
regulations plan
flood building
risk flood
power business
localism people
community ability
land event
water design
public risk
However whilst the role of prevention is not explicitly addressed in the ways resilience is 
defined and implemented, it is a part of the resilience agenda in relation to more day-to-day 
issues, such as petty crime or terrorism.  UK policy clearly states the importance of 4
enhancing resilience, particularly as the complexity of the challenges that the UK faces thus 
leading to ‘cascading disruptions’ (Cabinet Office, 2004b). Thus preventing the ‘cascade’ 
from happening is at the heart of the resilience agenda. However, the current policy does not 
provide guidance on what is prevention and what are the means of its implementation. 
Therefore during the process of being translated from policy to practice, prevention often 
becomes an enhanced preparedness – but without going into a ‘state’ of emergency; instead it 
is seen as a continuous preparation embodied in day-to day-activities. 
The focus on preparedness results in a situation where there is a distinction not only between 
the policies and the day-to-day work but also between those who protect and the population 
that has to be protected; as highlighted in the previous section of this chapter. Based on best 
practice, frameworks and guidelines, the resilience agenda in the UK is aimed at coordinating 
local governments rather than the communities who, it seems, are not trusted enough to be 
prepared by the policy makers but at the same time are encouraged to be prepared by those 
implementing the policy at the local level.  
The resilience agenda in the UK covers a wide range of issues and can be seen as a solution 
to a problem where, due to the interconnectedness of the world, many things have to be taken 
into account simultaneously. It covers every DRM related activity before, during and after an 
event thus making DRM one continuous cycle rather than a phase-based one. However, being 
preparedness and response oriented, the resilience agenda in the UK is neglecting the critical 
integration of preventative (such as hazard mitigation) considerations into the country’s 
development and planning practices and consequently does not sufficiently mainstream DRM 
into policy-making.  
The statutory role of emergency management practitioners in the UK also contributes to the 
emphasis on preparedness and recovery rather than on prevention. Playing a central role in all 
LRFs, local emergency managers probably want to be more cautious and risk-averse, thus 
making preparedness and recovery a predominant feature. In addition, emergency managers 
who are in charge of building and implementing resilience plans to respond (rather than be 
more preventive) to the events because that is the way they have been trained to operate, thus 
making preparedness and recovery a predominant feature. At this point it should be noted that 
this is not a problem unique to the UK; with the UN’s Global Assessment Report on Disaster 
Risk Reduction (UN 2015a) concluding that historically there has been poor proactive 
management of disaster risk globally due to an over reliance on emergency/civil protection 
expertise and ideologies. 
Such approaches, whilst making a shift towards building resilience and encouraging the 
implementation of resilience as a process rather than a command and control exercise, still 
remains highly centralised and dominated by prescriptive policy and the technicalities that 
come with it. Present approaches to resilience rely on implementation by those in charge 
while excluding those directly affected. Making resilience-related policies more flexible and 
allowing for the incorporation of prevention could provide an opportunity to develop local 
frameworks that respond to the local needs without being constrained to rather out-date 
institutional frameworks.  
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related to resilience, which included UK national policy documents ranging from 2000 to 2013, published on the UK 
government web site (www.gov.uk) and written by national agencies such as the Cabinet Office, Home Office etc. Overall, 
23 policy documents were thoroughly analysed. The second step involved analysing transcripts from 19 interviews 
conducted with various stakeholders that are directly or indirectly involved in the implementation of the ‘resilience’ agenda 
(including architects, The Head of regeneration, The Flood management officer,  emergency planning officers, liaison 
architectural officers (police), Fire and rescue service officer , The Counter-terrorism security advisor, property developers, 
an officer of the Civil Contingencies Research Office (police), urban planners). The semi-structured interviews were aimed 
at identifying the perceptions and representations that stakeholders make of resilience. They were conducted between May 
and October 2013 and lasted for approximately one hour each. Each interviewee was asked to define resilience and to 
comment on whether and how resilience is implemented in their day-to-day practice.  
The final step of the study consisted of comparing word uses, frequencies and discourses among policy documents and the 
transcripts of the interviews. This has been analysed using Nvivo 8 software; enabling patterns and analytical generalisations 
to be identified.  
 ‘R’ stands for a policy on resilience. Following list of policies have been analysed:  2
R1: Improving the UK's ability to absorb, respond to and recover from emergencies (Cabinet Office, 2013) 
R2: A summary of 2012 Sector resilience plans (Cabinet Office, 2012) 
R3: The National Risk Register of civil emergencies (Cabinet Office, 2012)  
R4: National Security Strategy (HM Government, 2010) 
R5: The national Planning policy framework (DCLG, 2012) 
R6: Keeping the country running: natural hazards and infrastructure (Cabinet Office, 2011) 
R7: Civil Contingencies Act (Cabinet Office, 2011)  
R8: The business continuity management standards (BS25999)  
R9: Strategic Framework and Policy Statement on Improving the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure to Disruption from 
Natural Hazards (Cabinet Office, 2010) 
R10: Protecting the UK against terrorism (Home Office, 2013)  
R11: CONTEST strategy (Home Office, 2011)  
R12: Terrorism Act (Home Office, 2000)  
R13: The role of Local Resilience Forum (Cabinet Office, 2013)  
R14: Improving the flood performance of the new buildings (DCLG, 2007)  
R15: Localism Act 2011  (HM Government, 2011)   
R16: Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience (Cabinet Office, 2011)  
R17: Climate resilient infrastructure: Preparing for a changing climate (DEFRA, 2011) 
R18: Building regulations (all relevant parts)   
R19: Adapting to climate change (DEFRA, 2013) 
R20: Flood and water management act (HM Government, 2010) 
R21: Maintaining UK energy security (DECC, 2013) 
R22: Providing regulation and licensing of energy industries and infrastructure (DECC, 2013) 
R23: Strategy for national infrastructure (HM Treasury, 2010) 
 Building resilience is often seen as an agenda that fits perfectly into the neoliberal state (Chandler, 2014) that ‘venerates 3
decentralisation, contextualisation, autonomy and independence’ (Handrup and Rosen, 2013: p.143). Whilst liberalism is 
about hands-on implementation, the approach of neoliberalism is more towards hands-off facilitation: in a neoliberal state 
relocation of authority – and simultaneously of responsibility - from the centre to the periphery takes place.  
 ‘Prevent’ is one of the four strands of CONTEST the Government’s ‘Counter Terrorism Strategy’ (HM Government, 2006)4
